

EDITORIAL

Friedrich Stadler

Dear members and colleagues,

We are pleased to release the second issue of our *Newsletter*, which is mainly dedicated to the philosophy of science in Greece on the occasion of the forthcoming 3rd conference of the European Philosophy of Science Association (EPSA11) in Athens, October 5-8, 2011.

Therefore, this special issue includes an informative report by *Stathis Psillos* on the development of philosophy of science in Greece and a shorter piece by *Theodore Arabatzis* on another major event in Athens next year, the meeting of the Integrated History and Philosophy of Science (&HPS) group in Athens.

Both authors are engaged in the conference: Psillos, the former EPSA President as Chair, and Arabatzis, a member of the Steering Committee as Co-Chair of the Local Organising Committee of EPSA11.



Hotel Titania, Venue of the EPSA11 Conference

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Besides these two contributions, we included the extended abstract of the 1st EPSA Lecture on the role of Bayesianism in philosophy and science, delivered by *Philippe Mongin* (Paris) at the 14th DLMPS Congress in Nancy last July, for those who could not attend this highly topical presentation.

The representative of our publisher Springer, *Ties Nijssen*, has provided information on recent developments regarding publications, esp. the second issue of the *European Journal for Philosophy of Science* (EJPS),

another permanent activity of our Association.

Finally, we are pleased to announce that the EPSA Newsletter will be available as a printable PDF-format accessible on our website: www.epsa.ac.at. Both issues are additionally attached to the Circular Letter. In the future, we intend to establish a forum for discussions, announcements, and reviews related to philosophy of science in Europe to which our members are invited to contribute.

Together with the EPSA Folder, which was already released and produced for dissemination in the hope of attracting new members and for a short self-presentation—also available on the EPSA-website—we are strengthening our efforts for the philosophy of science community.

We are looking forward to our conference in Athens and the future activities (publications and conferences) of our young Association.

Friedrich Stadler
(President of EPSA)



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
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PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE IN GREECE: PAST, PRESENT AND FUTURE

Stathis Psillos

Philosophy of science emerged in Greece in the early 1970s and started to acquire momentum after the fall of the military junta in 1974. Back then, philosophy as practiced in Greece was mostly concerned with the ancient Greek literature—mainly from an exegetical and philological point of view. There was also some interest in the history of philosophy—mainly the continental philosophy. Overall, there was little engagement in systematic and innovative philosophical research in the main areas of the discipline (perhaps with the exception of ethics).

It was the general intellectual climate that came with the fall of the dictatorship, fostering as it was theoretical pursuits, heated debates, open-mindedness and the critical spirit, which made room for the cultivation of analytic philosophy.



The Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens

There were the first translations into Greek of some classic papers of analytic philosophy and a growing interest in Wittgenstein's philosophy (with the translation into Greek of the *Tractatus* in 1971 and of the *Philosophical Investigations* in 1974). Most of the creative philosophical activity was still taking place outside the university and was organised by the *Centre of Philosophical Research* (founded by Paul Christodoulidis), which operated in Athens.

The CPR established the philosophical quarterly *Deukalion*, named after the mythological hero who survived the Deluge with his wife Pyrrha and re-created humanity. The journal

published mostly translations of some important philosophical papers and to a lesser extent some original research. Three issues in 1975, 1977 and 1978 respectively were dedicated to translations of some major papers in the philosophy of science (by Popper, Hempel and Kuhn), the philosophy of physics (by Reichenbach, Bohr and Langevin) and the philosophy of biology (by Dobzhansky, Mayr, and Maynard-Smith).

CPR also organised series of lectures, seminars and courses for the general public, taught by the founding members of the CPR and by younger scholars who had recently finished their PhDs, mostly abroad.

These courses were regularly published in a series called 'Philosophy Chapters' and brought a younger generation of philosophers and scientists in contact with analytic philosophy.

Circa 1978, the Association of Physicists and members of the Physics Dept of the University of Athens started to organise series of seminars and conferences on the foundations of physics. A key role was played by the French-educated physicist and philosopher of science Eftichios Bitsakis, who founded the Interdisciplinary Research Group and had already published a number of books on philosophical issues in modern physics, mainly from a Marxist viewpoint.

In Thessaloniki, during the 1970s, there was a group of young mainstream philosophers in the Aristotle University working around George Mourellos (1912-1993), who was educated in France and had some interest in the methodology of science. (He published a book on Meyerson's philosophy in French in the late 1960s). Nikos Avgelis wrote his dissertation on the concept of causation in modern philosophy of science and had a sustained interest in analytic philosophy and the Logical Positivism. He also supervised the translation into Greek of some of the (less demanding) works of Schlick (his London Lectures on *Form and Content*) and Carnap. He was quite ahead of his time in discerning a certain Kantian element in the work of Carnap; but little on this was published outside the informative intro-

duction to the Greek translation of Carnap's *Philosophy and the Logical Syntax of Language*. It was under Avgelis's supervision that Christodoulidis wrote his dissertation on the deductive-nomological model of explanation, offering the first in Greek systematic account of neo-positivism, and that Vassilis Kalfas wrote his own dissertation on issues of rationality and scientific progress.



Greek editions of Lakatos', Feyerabend's and Kuhn's major works



Back in Athens, a group of philosophers of social science and scientists (most notably Demetris Dimitrakos and Costas Krimbas) formed in 1983 the *Group of Critical and Scientific Thought: Karl Popper* and had regular seminars. Popper's falsification-

ism started to spread, though his major philosophy of science works have yet to be translated into Greek. A talented young member of the group, Emiliios Metaxopoulos (1955-2010) translated into Greek in 1986 Lakatos's book on the MSRP and published in 1988 a notable book (in Greek) titled *Convention and Truth: the adventures of modern epistemology from Duhem to Lakatos*.

Kuhn's *Structure* was translated into Greek by Kalfas in 1981. The reception of the *Structure* was extremely warm. The book immediately struck a very sensitive cord among a group of Marxism-oriented scientists who,



arguably, found in the *Structure* a philosophical reading of the history of science congenial to the structuralist and Marxist schools of French philosophy in the 1960s and the French epistemological tradition. This group was based at the General Science Dept of the National Technical University of Athens (NTUA) and its core were Aristedes Baltas, Kostas Gavroglu, Aris Koutoungos and Pantelis Nikolakopoulos (1952-2001). This group was joined by the physicist Giorgos Goudaroulis (1945-

1996) of the School of Engineering in Thessaloniki, who translated into Greek Feyerabend's *Against Method* in 1985.

Gavroglu and Goudaroulis founded a book-series on epistemology and philosophy of science with a small independent publisher, in which the translations of Kuhn, Lakatos and Feyerabend as well as some monographs by Greek authors appeared. The fact that Popper, Kuhn, Lakatos and co became popular in Greece at a time when they had started losing their centrality in the Anglo-American scene explains (at least partly) the tendency towards general philosophy of science that prevailed, and is still dominant, in Greece.

A new law governing the universities was voted in the Parliament in 1982, which rendered the Greek higher education far more democratic and egalitarian. Younger and promising people could now take junior posts in the university and the creation of new disciplines was encouraged.

In this new setting, the NTUA group took an important step towards the consolidation of history and philosophy of science in Greece, by founding, in 1982, a graduate programme in HPS, which was accompanied by a series of seminars and workshops with foreign academics.

A number of younger persons were educated in HPS in this programme. The NTUA group organised in 1986 in Thessaloniki a major international conference on Lakatos titled: 'Criticism and the Growth of Knowledge: Twenty years after', the proceedings of which were published in 1989 in

the *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*.

In the middle of 1980s, the Greek logician Dionysis Anapolitanos came back from Pittsburgh with a prize-winning PhD on Leibniz and the Continuum Hypothesis, which was directed by Wilfrid Sellars. Anapolitanos brought back with him the possibility of a link with the Pittsburgh Center for Philosophy of Science. So around the middle of 1980s, there was a critical mass of mostly philosophically-minded scientists with a solid interest in history and philosophy of science.

It was in this period that systematic research papers in philosophy of science written by Greeks started to appear in international journals and collections. A good sample of the state of Greek philosophy of science towards the end of the 80s can be found in the book *Greek Studies in Philosophy and History of Science* (in *Boston Studies in the Philosophy of Science*, 1990).

The link between the emerging Greek community and the Pittsburgh Center came to fruition and proved instrumental for the institutional establishment of philosophy of science in Greece. In 1992, Jerry Massey (the then director of the Pittsburgh Center) entrusted the Greek community with the organisation of the second international conference of the Center's fellows, which took place in Athens. Since then, there have been four Athens-Pittsburgh international conferences in 1996 (*The Problem of Anthropomorphism in Science and Philosophy*, in Del-

phi; in 1998 (*The History and Philosophy of Greek Medical Traditions from Hippocrates to Harvey*, held at the University of Athens); in 2000 (*Experience and Knowledge*, held at the University of Crete); and in 2003 (*Proof and Demonstration in Philosophy and Science*, in Delphi).

At the end of the 1980s, a number of younger people with links to the NTUA group (Arabatzis, Arageorgis, Karakostas, Psillos) went to the US (Princeton, Pittsburgh) and the UK (Cambridge, London) and completed PhDs in history and philosophy of science. All of them returned to Greece by the end of 1990s and got academic posts. With them, we have a second generation of Greek philosophers of science.

By the early years of the last decade of the twentieth century, a philosophy of science community with good research credentials and international links had grown roots. With them, the idea of a *Department of Philosophy and History of Science* had started to ripen. The driving force behind the creation of this department was Anapolitanos, who should be credited not only with the vision that the discipline would flourish with the presence of a university department, but also with the masterly execution of the plan.

Various contingencies played, as always, a key role. One of them was that the then Rector of the University of Athens, Petros Gemptos, was an economist and lawyer very much imbued in the philosophy of the social sciences. Other existing groups and individuals, like the NTUA

group, Christodoulidis and Krimbas (one geneticist and one historian of biology), supported this endeavour wholeheartedly.

For various reasons that had mostly to do with the opposition of the Division of traditional philosophy in the University of Athens, the department was dubbed Dept of *Methodology, History and Theory of Science* (though in English the official title is *Dept of Philosophy and History of Science*). It was officially launched in 1992 (with a unanimous decision of the Senate of the University of Athens) and admitted its first undergraduates in the academic year 1994-95. A year later, the PHS dept of the University of Athens and the Humanities Division of the NTUA established a joint graduate programme in History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, with a PhD strand. This graduate programme has become one of the focal points of philosophy of science in Greece, with numerous graduate students, academic visitors, conferences and other activities. What is now a third generation of Greek philosophers of science have been educated in this programme. In 1996, a new History and Philosophy of Science journal was established—*Neusis*—which has become the vehicle through which most philosophical research in Greece (and in Greek) is disseminated.


During the almost twenty years of its existence, the PHS dept of the University of Athens has grown from strength to strength. Having the view that philosophy of science is an integral part of philosophy, it has acquired some important strengths in analytic philosophy, ancient philosophy, logic, epistemology and metaphysics, appointing a number of

researchers) in scientific realism (Psillos), the metaphysics of science (Psillos, Karakostas), philosophy of physics (Karakostas), the ancient philosophy and science (Ieorodiakou, Kalligas), conceptual change (Arabatzis, Kindi), philosophy of maths & logic (Anapolitanos, Dimitracopoulos) and the philosophy of economics (Mantzavinos).

The department has also lively research groups in the history of science (led by Gavroglu and Demetris Dialetis), in the cognitive science (led by Stella Vosniadou) and in the history and philosophy of the social sciences. It is noteworthy that members of the dept have authored 11 books (published by international presses) and have edited another 35 books (again published by international presses). In 2010, the dept organised the first Greek Congress of Philosophy of Science, with over 120 contributed papers and over 200 participants. In the end of the same year, the dept went through a process of evaluation by an international team of philosophers and was deemed to be a centre of excellence in philosophical research in

Greece. The evaluation report (in English) can be accessed at [http://www.adip.gr/eks/MITHE%20Report%20Final%20\(2\).pdf](http://www.adip.gr/eks/MITHE%20Report%20Final%20(2).pdf).

Philosophy of science has also grown in the Division of Humanities of



Neusis. Biannual Journal for the History and Philosophy of Science and Technology, Issue 18 (2009), dedicated to the history of technology.

excellent younger philosophers who did their PhDs in analytic philosophy mostly in the UK. What may be called the British School of Philosophy is now a major force in the Greek philosophical scene. The dept has research groups (whose members are post-doctoral and doctoral

NTUA, under the leadership of Baltas, who was recently awarded a prestigious award of excellence in teaching and research. In the Dept of Philosophy and Education in the Aristotle University of Thessaloniki there is a dynamic group of post-doctoral researchers, led by Demetra Sfendoni-Mentzou (who did her PhD on the philosophy of Charles Peirce under Mourellos in the early 1980s). This group has focused its research on Aristotle's philosophy and science, with a special interest in Aristotle's possible relevance to modern science. Kalfas, who after many years in the University of Crete is now in Thessaloniki, has shifted his attention to ancient Greek philosophy and science.

Outside Athens and Thessaloniki, there is a pocket of interest in the philosophy of science in the University of Crete (George Roussopoulos on Logical Empiricism, and Voula Tsinorema on bioethics). In one way or another, philosophy of science has grown roots in all philosophy departments and divisions of Greek universities. There is no doubt that philosophy of science in Greece has come of age.

What lies ahead in the future? The prospects of philosophy of science in Greece hung on the currently emerging third generation of philosophers

of science, made mostly of home-grown PhDs. There are, to be sure, a few doctoral students who currently finish promising dissertations abroad and can help carry the torch forward. But it is my firm belief that the future of the community lies in its ability to consistently produce home-grown PhDs of high quality and international standards. The good news is that we have been on the way to achieve this, as is evinced by the fact that, with increasing pace and consistency, doctoral and post-

doctoral researchers publish in international journals and have their papers accepted for presentation in major (refereed) international conferences.

Philosophy of science in Greece can gain by strengthening the links among the various research groups in Greek universities and by sharpening its international profile and orientation. The upcoming EPSA11 conference in Athens is a major step in this direction. I am sure there are more to come.



A selection of publications by Greek philosophers and historians of science



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A REVIVAL OF INTEGRATED HISTORY AND PHILOSOPHY OF SCIENCE

Theodore Arabatzis

Integrated history and philosophy of science (HPS) has a notable past, going back to the 19th century. William Whewell, Ernst Mach, and Pierre Duhem, to mention three great 19th century scholars, preached and practiced a historically oriented philosophy of science and a philosophically inclined history of science. In 20th century France the connection

between HPS remained strong, as testified to by the work of Alexander Koyré, Georges Canguilhem, and Michel Foucault, among others.

In the German and, especially, Anglophone academic world, on the other hand, the relationship between HPS went through several phases: from a respectful mutual indifference in the 1940s and 1950s, through a troubled rapprochement in the 1960s and 1970s (in the wake of the historicist turn in philosophy of science), to an awkward and not always peaceful co-existence in the 1980s and 1990s.

There are encouraging signs though that the pendulum has started to swing in the opposite direction. Re-

cently, an international committee of historians and philosophers of science was formed with the aim to advance the integration of the two fields. For that purpose, the committee has launched a series of conferences, where a rich variety of approaches in integrated HPS has already been presented. The first three conferences in the series were hosted by American Institutions with established traditions in HPS: the University of Pittsburgh, the University of Notre Dame, and the University of Indiana. The next conference in the series will take place in Europe and will be hosted by the Department of Philosophy and History of Science at the University of Athens:

Integrated History and Philosophy of Science - &HPS4

Department of Philosophy and History of Science, University of Athens, Greece

March 15-18, 2012

<http://conferences.phs.uoa.gr/andhps/>

Keynote speakers:

Jed Z. Buchwald (California Institute of Technology)

Thomas Ryckman (Stanford University)



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WHAT THE BAYESIAN DECISION THEORIST COULD TELL THE BAYESIAN PHILOSOPHER

Philippe Mongin

*Extended abstract of the 1st EPSA
Lecture given at the 14th CLMPS in
Nancy (France), 19-26 July 2011.*



<http://www.clmps2011.org>

A pervasive doctrine of both science and philosophy, Bayesianism is not conceived of in the same way in all

the fields it permeates, and this has contributed to make its definition elusive. A glance at epistemology, philosophy of science, decision theory, statistics, and computer science, testifies to differences both in content and emphasis.

By and large, there are two main Bayesian tenets, i.e., that (i) uncertainties should be captured in terms of probability functions, and (ii) the incoming information in terms of conditioning these functions, but the emphasis on each tenet varies with the field, and there is a third tenet that is clearly optional, i.e., that (iii) decisions are to be made in accordance to the expected utility (EU) rule and its axiomatic foundations.

This last claim is essential to all Bayesian decision theorists and statisticians, but by no means to all Bayesian philosophers.

Arguments for (i) and (ii) can be classified as *pragmatic* or *non-pragmatic*, depending on whether or not they go through (iii) to reach their aim. Philosophers like Earman (1992) or Maher (1993) have defended pragmatic arguments borrowed from, or based on, decision

theory, while others, like Howson and Urbach (1993), have rejected these arguments and exclusively relied on non-pragmatic ones.

Still others, like Joyce (1999), have a relatively liberal view of the two styles of justification of probability and conditioning.

The present lecture is concerned with this major philosophical conflict, but it would be too bold to sketch a solution within its scope, and we are content with clarifying a particular set of pragmatic arguments, leaving the other pragmatic and non-pragmatic arguments aside. We focus on a severe complication of EU theory, *state-dependence*, which is famous among Bayesian decision theorists but regrettably much lesser known to Bayesian philosophers - hence the title for the lecture.

We first explain the difficulties that state-dependence raises for Bayesian decision theory, second dramatise them and show that they also threaten Bayesian philosophy, and third and last, after reviewing alternative suggestions, account for some decision-theoretic work that aims at removing them.

The conclusion favours the pragmatic against the non-pragmatic camp within the limits of the chosen set of arguments.

To implement the first part of the programme, we revisit the masterpiece of Bayesian decision theory, i.e., Savage's *Foundations of Statistics* (1972), in a somewhat unusual way. Instead of centring on the "sure-thing principle" (P2), as most commentators have done, we emphasise postulates (P3) and (P4), explaining how they capture the *state-independence* assumption that the agent's preferences do not vary across states or events of the world.

We also explain why Savage needs this assumption in order to translate the agent's preferences between his possible acts into a satisfactory EU representation, i.e., one in which the probability measure is uniquely well-defined.

It is easy to argue that the opposite assumption of *state-dependence* captures a natural psychological attitude and no irrationality at all. Hence Savage fails short of his programme, which was to apply the requisites of practical rationality, and nothing else, in order to recover the three tenets (i), (ii), and (iii).

At this stage, we provisionally side with those non-pragmatic philosophers who have interpreted Savage's results disparagingly.

The second part of the lecture begins by arguing that Bayesian epistemologists and philosophers of science cannot escape the difficulties of state-dependence.

Epistemic agents, and typically scientists, in effect make choices under uncertainty, and Savage's system was meant to instruct pragmatic Bayesian philosophers on how they should formalise these choices.

However, as we claim, neither (P3) nor perhaps (P4) should be assumed in the epistemic or scientific context. We emphasise that state-dependence blocks the derivation not only of (i) but also of (ii) - a crucial point about Bayesian revision that has often escaped notice.

As we further argue, there are four main options to circumvent the difficulties:

Option 1 is to cut one's losses and restrict the application domain of Savage's theory to the cases covered by (P3) and (P4).

Option 2, which is Savage's, consists in arguing that decision problems can always be given a state-independent form by an appropriate redefinition of states, consequences and acts.

Option 3 is to move to Jeffrey's (1983) competing system.

Option 4 exploits some technical results of post-Savagian EU theory, which require more preference comparisons on the agent's part, and by suitably defined new postulates, manage to accommodate state-dependence while delivering a uniquely well-defined probability measure.

The third and last part of the lecture critically discusses these four proposals:

Option 1 is described as being sound and realistic, but low-profile. It can fit the needs of insurance or financial

economists, who can bear with (P3) and (P4) in various applications, but not really those of pragmatic Bayesian philosophers, who are after universally valid norms of rationality.

Option 2 is discussed in terms of Savage's own examples in the *Foundations* and rebutted as being spurious.

We also discard Option 3 on the ground that Jeffrey's system avoids the problem of state-dependence simply because it lacks the capacity of expressing it.

Option 4 is our favourite one, and we give a flavour of how post-Savagians, like Karni (1985, 1996) and collaborators (including this writer, see Karni and Mongin, 2000), have attempted to overcome the problem. Essentially, they require the agent to express preferences *across* states of the world, hence counterfactual preferences, on top of those expressed between possible courses of actions, which are the only ones considered by Savage and classical decision theorists.

Both the old and the new sets of preferences are subjected to postulates, like (P2), which can standardly be interpreted in terms of practical rationality, and they are connected between themselves by a specific coherence condition, which can arguably be interpreted along the same line.

The result is that (P3) and (P4) are dispensed with, but owing to the added material, a EU representation nonetheless exists with the desirable property that the probability measure is uniquely well-defined. That is to say, the new work obtains (i) from (iii) without Savage's unpalatable

restrictions; it can be checked that (ii) also follows.

In spite or because of its complexity, this work provides the best scheme

that seems available to date for a pragmatic foundation of probability and conditioning. At this stage of the lecture, we side with the pragmatic camp against the other, and even if

not all Bayesian philosophers would agree with us, we hope to have convinced them that contemporary Bayesian decision theory can be an inspiring source.

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A NOTE FROM THE PUBLISHER SPRINGER


Ties Nijssen

Dear members of EPSA,

the second issue of EJPS is out, and I trust you will have seen that the quality of the articles reflects the mission and ambition of your society.

To keep you informed about all new issues, the board had granted Springer the right to send you Table of Content Alerts of future issues of EJPS.

This means you will receive three e-mails per year from Springer with the links to the articles of EJPS.



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Should you have any questions about this service or about Springer, please come and see me during the EPSA11 conference in Athens or drop me an e-mail:

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